0:00 And where are [music] you going? What do you want? [music] Hello and welcome to Business Lessons from the Military. I'm your host, Kevin Bemel, and I'm here every Tuesday at 10 o'clock Pacific time to talk about uh military history, doctrine, and leadership practices and then distill from them lessons that we can apply to our businesses and professional practices.
0:35 So, uh, today I'm starting a 24 episode series and it's going to pull from doctrine kind of across the military spectrum and we're going to deal with a range of topics starting with strategy. So the the idea behind this is uh while I when I first started the show I did a whole series based on Marine Corps warf fighting doctrine. What I'm doing here is is is really looking at how the
1:13 military in total uh looks at uh strategy, operations and execution here in in the contemporary world where a lot of operations probably most operations in one way or another are joint operations meaning they involve more than one branch of the milit military. Indeed, it was really that was something that started in World War II when, for example, um there were amphibious landings done
1:51 on islands in the Pacific theater of the war. and the Navy would deliver Marines and Army units uh who would then um land on the beaches and pursue the landbased goals. Um and while the Air Force was not the I the Army Air Force, what became known as the Air Force wasn't a big factor in uh the Pacific theater. In the European theater, of course, it was. Now at the time uh the air force was
2:26 known as the army air forces. It was part of the army and so one wouldn't necessarily call that a joint operation in the context of today. But the idea of various branches of the military cooperating happened in the European theater as well. for example, on D-Day where navy navy ships transported army units across uh the English Channel um provided fire support onto the beaches etc. So, [clears throat] I said this is going to be a a 24
3:04 episode roughly six months um um series here and uh hopefully uh you'll find it interesting, informative and and it'll you know it'll it'll really be something worth your while uh to to to follow. So [clears throat] today's topic, topic number one, uh I'm going to be talking about uh a a core military strategic idea known as the known as ends, ways,
3:39 and means. So typically, whether in the military or in the business world, a strategy doesn't fail from lack of ambition. It usually comes from unrealistic plans. And and so the the core idea within ends, ways and means is that a military campaign will succeed or fail to the extent that its goals, the ends, the plan, the ways and the resources, the
4:17 means will will either align or not. If they align, there's a very good chance of success. If they do not align, uh there's a good chance that the campaign or the strategy will fail. So [clears throat] the idea was uh to create what amounts to a brutally honest test forcing military leaders to confront uh how not only what they want to accomplish but how they will accomplish
4:54 it and whether they actually have the resources to do so. And in that way, uh, they would avoid being surprised, um, that, you know, they're they're running out of re resources or such. And I've I've talked about different battles on this show where there were misalignments between uh, ends, ways, and means. Now, not necessarily in that context. So, I'm going to do that in this format today because I think this is an a very useful
5:30 tool. No matter what the size of your business, even if you're a a soloreneur like me, it's a great way to very quickly get at the heart of any particular initiative that you're going to take with your business. So, I'm going to start I'll give you a little bit of the history of this doctrine. Um, N's Ways and Means was really originated by the United States Army. Um, it it really came out of the US Army War College [snorts] and it was formalized
6:07 after World War II and and as we moved and and and refined, I'm sorry, and then was refined as we moved into the Cold War period. So the US military had to com had to plan complex oftentimes long duration campaigns under political, economic and resource constraints. So in World War II, while there were constraints, for example, there were manpower constraints, especially toward the end of World War II, the country was
6:42 on a wartime footing and and its ability to generate material, tanks, airplanes, munitions, guns, etc. What what you know just increased enorm enormously. One could easily make the case, I think, that the reason the allies won World War II was because the United States was able to gear up military uh production so effectively. Uh so in the postw World War II and moving into the cold war period so the US Army war college uh
7:23 created and refined this this doctrine and it became um joint doctrine meaning um how things were going to be done when more than one service branch was involved. Um it it really came through kind of a uh a process of looking at Klaus wetszian theory um purpose the idea of a purpose-driven war um but also national security strategy planning as well as joint strategic planning. So all of these sort of came together in the
7:59 development of this doctrine. And then by the 1980s through the 1990s, the N's ways means uh concept had real was really a foundational concept that was taught at at the Army War College, the naval war college and the air war college. And it was um it basically was codified in joint publication JP in other words five five TACO which is part of the which is the joint planning portion of of JP5. So it it really now is part of the
8:38 strategic language that military planners use and and one can imagine. So for example with in in the um in the uh wasn't really a campaign it was the um uh incident I guess of of bombing for example the Ford nuclear facility in Iran um while I don't know this firsthand you know if I did I couldn't talk to you about it uh I I imagine N's ways and means was used to develop
9:15 how the United States would deal with uh Iran's escalating nuclear ambitions, right? Um it became was a very limited strike. um the way that it was done with, you know, um long range bombers launching from the central United States and and I the uh you know other bombers launching from other places to create uh a a a sense of what is really going on here. Um and then of course the means
9:50 using those those deep piercing munitions, right? All of it was designed to create a particular impact not just of course on the facilities themselves but a a geopolitical impact. Um and and so the you can see in in in this uh very limited example ends we ways and means being used quite effectively. So um why was it necessary to create this doctrine post World War II? Well, um,
10:25 part of it was because there were it it seemed like there was this sort of recurring failure mode. So, political leaders would set ambitious ends. Um, military planners would develop these elegant means I ways I mean um but resources and public support which were the means were insufficient or eroded over time. So look at an example like operation market garden which was initiated by uh Bernard Montgomery Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery the
11:01 the most senior British commander involved in the European theater. So the idea was to send forces down this sort of fairly narrow path um through um the Netherlands to get to um Nigmayan um and then from there kind of break through and get into Germany. And the the ends were very ambitious. The idea was to be able to break through and and you know end the war by the end of 1944. [snorts] Uh at at the latest um the plan
11:37 was was you know quite elegant but the means were just not there. landing these um airborne uh troops far ahead of where uh regular troops and and armor could reach um based on the constraints of the roads that they on which they had to travel. The means were were were just not there. They were completely insufficient. Um, now this type of ends, ways and means planning wasn't being used at this point in World War II. And it was, I think, one could argue that it
12:12 was the failure of such operations as market garden that necessitated the development of this type of strategy. So, um, some some examples of how it's been used, um, you know, post World War II unsuccessfully and successfully. So the looking at the Vietnam War, not just any particular battle, but the war in general, right? The ends uh of the Vietnam War were to prevent the spread or expansion of communism in Southeast
12:47 Asia. So the means was this sort of gradual escalation, this attrition strategy, but the means with limited troop levels and constrained terms of engagement, fragile what became fragile domestic support really eroded the ways and in the end it, you know, proved that that the ends were more ambitious than what um both political leadership ship and with with the sort of ongoing watching the ongoing nightly
13:23 death tolls and wounded tolls really uh you know became more than what the American people were were willing to absorb as well. So um you know this is a sort of textbook example of of of ends ways and means not aligning in a way that um if one had looked at it under under that strategy would have seen that that how Vietnam the Vietnam war was prosecuted was was unlikely to
13:59 be successful. And if you talk to people who study the war today, they will tell you that this sort of gradual strategy and and and sort of, you know, limited application of resources, it just it it just wasn't going to work. Um, okay. But then move on to uh 1991, uh, Operation Desert Storm. So, the ANS were to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. So there's a a very limited scope to that operation. The ways were
14:35 to create a coalition for for warfare, create air superiority followed by rapid ground maneuver and the means were just just massive coalition forces. There was a clear political mandate and overwhelming logistical support. And in the event because the ends ways and means were aligned, the campaign went off extremely well. It concluded very quickly and it met its objectives which was to kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait. So
15:11 that's an I that's an example of re relatively modern um disciplined strategic planning that then was able to deliver the the ends that you know leadership the Bush administration at that time was seeking to achieve. So contrast that with the war in Afghanistan which lasted for 20 years from 2001 to 2021. the the initial ends was to disrupt al al-Qaeda and remove Taliban safe havens,
15:48 but it morphed into a nationbuilding exercise with the idea that, you know, democratic institutions were going to be established in Afghanistan and create and and create a a a um block of sort not a block but a a point of regional stab ability. So, pardon me, there was mission drift there over the 20 years that was problematic. The ways which was basically counterterrorism, counterinsurgency
16:24 leading into state building. I mean, the ways had to keep increasing in order to uh keep up with the ends as they changed. Um but the means and this is where it became problematic were were always underresourced for the ends and and ways because the there was inconsistent force levels. There was shifting political wills. there was unclear authority and in the end there was there was this rather ignominious
16:59 uh withdrawal and and of course Afghanistan essentially is back today where it where it was you know in the 1990s. So again this is an example where because ends ways and means was not rigorously applied um you had this mission drift you had a you had these these sort of plans that became very gr um I'm sorry yeah you had the ways the plans which became very grandiose but the means never kept up with with either one. So
17:37 why do why in spite of the fact that over the last you know 60 years I I' I've given you you know two out of three examples that failed well one can see where it's rigorously applied like an operation desert storm it's very effective right and and so why do military leaders still use it? Well, um it it it's because the the it forces an explicit prioritization. So, uh you know, we we don't have
18:13 unlimited military resources today. In fact, our military resources are fairly heavily constrained. And so, when the military is asked to to plan an operation, it does so under this strategy. Now keep in mind that the the final decision is doesn't rest with the military. So it's civilian political leadership that gives the final decision about whether to embark on any particular war campaign etc. And so the the ends, ways and means on the military
18:50 side could be planned um very well. Um but because of how civilian leadership wants to pursue a particular strategy that may negate the the quality planning that was done under N's ways and means. Uh and so you know the the the military may say look we don't have enough forces to achieve the ends that you want to achieve. So we need you civilian leadership to prioritize the ends so
19:28 that we can give you an idea of what is likely to be gain, what may be gain and what is unlikely to be gain. Right?
19:36 >> [snorts]
19:36 >> So the military continues to use the strategy uh to advise civilian leadership, but of course civilian leadership doesn't necessarily have to take that advice. So another reason that military leadership continues to use it is it helps surface risks and assumptions that are embedded in the strategic planning so that they can be dealt with before an operation starts. uh next it helps to identify where there's this sort of strategic inflation
20:12 like there was in Afghanistan. So it really enables military leaders to say in essence we can't do all of this. So what matters most civilian leadership so that we can present you with a plan that has a high likelihood of of succeeding. So um in from a military plan uh perspective so misalignment of ends, ways and means is considered negligence not optimism. And it's negligence
20:48 because it often times means that people are killed or wounded, you know, to no achievable end. And that's a very high price to pay as opposed to in the business world where if our ends ends, ways and means are not aligned, rarely does that end up in the deaths of people. Um, typically what it means is financial and other uh resources are wasted, squandered perhaps, but but nobody dies. So it's an existential
21:23 uh strategy for the military. um whereas it's it's more of a uh financial strategy or um uh for for businesses. Okay. So, I'm going to take a quick break and then I'm going to come back and apply this to the business world. Oh, well, actually I'm not. That's right. We don't have a sponsor today. Uh okay. So um I have um five ways that ends ways and means can be uh translated
21:58 um into the business world. So um number one stress test uh growth targets before you announce them. Okay. So you know companies are you hear these announcements pretty regularly. um you know, we're going to grow revenue by, you know, x percent, we're going to grow market share by x percent. So, okay, that's that's all good and well, but are those ends are those targets grounded in reality or are they just storytelling
22:35 for the sake of investors and shareholders and such? Okay. Is this is this being done to try and inspire, you know, the team? Um but in the end uh you know it'll end up demoralizing them because uh you know the whole thing is not based in reality. Okay. And so then once you've once you've identified an ends so what are the ways what are your plans for getting it and and are those plans assuming perfect execution
23:11 ideal hiring zero friction right so dig into the plans where can the plans go wrong what could sideline progress toward the ends, toward the goals, right? That's the point of looking at the ways is is looking for the holes in your plans. Okay? And then finally, the means. Do you actually have the resources to to enact the the plans to enact the ways that that you have
23:48 created? Do you have the personnel? Do you have the cash on hand? Does leadership have the bandwidth to sustain this push? Um, and and those are just the general categories of of leadership, right? And you know, we we we see this all the time. Again, I I just um a few weeks ago, I did a show about um how over ambitious expansion plans really did in Crispy Creams and and I think it's
24:24 largely because they crispy Cream didn't do this kind of ends, ways, and means strategizing ahead of the game. And so they ended up expanding way too fast. They didn't have uh the resources in terms of the ability to supply equipment. They didn't have the leadership bandwidth. They didn't have the ability to train new store owners in the systems. And so the whole thing fell apart. And it turned out that their ends were not grounded in reality. Okay. So
25:01 um if if growth requires hero her heroics okay it's not a strategy it's just a gamble and I think there's you know because we can't control market forces business is enough of a gamble uh without turning our plans and and taking the things that we do mostly have in our control and and sort of tossing them to the winds. Okay. So, stress test your growth targets. Okay. Before you announce them, make sure that
25:37 they're grounded in reality. Okay. Number two, expose hidden assumptions in strategic plans. Okay. So, um the ends can sound clean. So, we want to expand revenue by 20% in this fiscal year. Okay. That's a pretty pretty clear goal. you have 12 months to grow revenue by 20%. Okay. But um there there are many things embedded in that or many assumptions embedded in that. Okay. Now and and and those
26:13 assumptions need to be examined. So in if if we're planning on increasing revenue by 20%. Are we planning on increasing it 10% every six months, 2 and a half% every four months? I'm sorry, every three months. Um, or are, you know, are we essentially planning on increasing revenue by 1.66% um or Yeah. 1218, I'm sorry. Yeah. 1.66% per month over the next 12 months or are we planning we're going to gear up the
26:49 first three months? So, we're not going to really see much revenue increasing for the first three months, but after that, it's going to increase pretty steadily at about 2% a month to meet our goal over the next nine months. What is really what are the in assumptions that are embedded in the ends that that we need to uh you know that we need to examine as we put together the ways as we put together uh our plans. is are you know is there an embedded assumption that our technology
27:26 will run smoothly and it is robust enough to to um to support this type of expansion. Okay. Uh will the how will the culture respond to the business growing by essentially a fifth over the next year? Do we have the personnel to support that expansion? It's it's all good and well to get the sales in the door, okay? But what about the ability to service those new clients or customers? Do they exist? Right? I I I
28:02 talked about this example, I think a couple of weeks ago. I was talking to a pro p prospective source of business and he was talking about, you know, ramping up business and blah blah blah blah blah. And I said, you know what? I didn't say this this to him. I said, "You have a hu you're part of a huge organization. You've got dozens of people to service your clients and and the ability to scale that up much more rapidly than I do." So, I'm not looking for that kind of rapid growth. uh for
28:37 for my business, if I get one new key client a year, hey, that's a fantastic year for me because the kind of revenue a key client will generate um and and and then what I want to be able to do in terms of serving servicing that client. Okay. I need to be able to devote my attention to the new client while still making sure that my existing clients are well taken care of. For me to get, you know, three or four key new clients in a year, it would probably wreck my
29:14 business because there would be no way for me to properly service all those new clients. And for me to get the people in that I would need to do that would be very difficult because the kind of skill set that I need to have in the people with whom I work is not so easy to find. Right? So we need to look at the hidden assumptions basically unhide them unmask them in our strategic plans to make sure that things are aligned. So if
29:50 assumptions stay implicit, in other words, stay hidden, failure arrives as a surprise. Whereas if we uncover the assumptions, okay, now we we may we going back to the example of a 20% sales growth. Okay, we may decide okay we need three months to ramp up for this. Um, but then our assumption is going to be that that sales are going to grow like 1.9% a month for the next nine months. Okay, we know that's what the assumptions are. By the way, those
30:25 assumptions may turn out to be unrealistic. Okay, maybe what we need to do is ramp up for three months, plan for maybe a 1% sales growth growth for the first three months, and then over the last six months, we need to have something closer to 2 and a half% sales growth growth per month over this the la the final six months of the 12-month period. Whatever we make our assumptions, make them explicit, examine them carefully, and at least that way if they don't come about, it's
31:01 not a surprise we, you know, we know where we were uh perhaps too ambitious, too optimistic in our planning. Okay. Number three, align resources before launching an initiative. Okay. So too often businesses love starting initiatives without allocating the proper means. This was really the story with Crispy Cream that I mentioned a few minutes ago. So military planners asks
31:36 what stops if this starts because they know they have a li they have limited means. They're not going to be able to grow personnel rapidly. Okay? In fact, e even now with the change of administration and military recruiting going much better than it did in the in the years before, it's still hard to find enough people to recruit into the United States military. In fact, because of various issues like drug use, obesity
32:13 um um and and and uh involvement in the criminal justice system, the United States today with probably, you know, double or maybe two and a half times the population that it had during World War II probably could not field a force as large as the force that it fielded during World War II. Okay. So there are very real constraints on means in from a military standpoint. Okay. And so if the United States military is going to
32:49 launch a new campaign, okay, that may mean that it has to draw resources from somewhere else, meaning that campaign is going to stop or stall in order to pursue this new one. Now in general the same is true for businesses. Most businesses do not have unlimited resources. Even today when we look at the the the the you know mag 7 tech technology companies and their expenditures on capital improvements
33:25 uh on things like artificial intelligence and etc. and it seemed they're spending, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars and it seems like the the the means are endless. That is not the case. So once once we start looking below the surface, we see there are real limitations to the capex that these companies can spend. And in fact, investors [clears throat] are starting to look at that more closely recently to understand how sustainable are these investment plans
34:01 because they are what's undergirling the means I'm sorry undergirling the ends which which is to you know be the most significant player in the AI field. That's what all of these companies are vying to do. Okay. and they have their plans for doing so, but are the means to execute those plans actually there? Okay. So, um you know in in looking at this now from more of a business perspective. So, we don't talk in terms of campaigns, we tend to talk in more in
34:38 terms of projects. So if we are going to allocate resources to a new project, uh which other projects are going to get deprioritized, right? There's probably going to have to be a tradeoff there unless unless the business can significantly increase its means. Okay. Um who and and in line with that, who is no longer available, right? If if um this particular individual is heading up this project but now has to be diverted is going to be diverted to the new project, what's going to happen
35:13 with that old project? Who is available to take over that old project or that current project maybe is a better way of describing it while this person is while this particular person is being taken to or is being diverted to take on the new one. Okay. So what kind of authority shifts are required in order to make sure I've been using leadership in this example to make sure that leadership is available to support all of these different projects all of these different initiatives. So strategizing
35:50 without looking at reallocation of resources is really just wishful thinking because no initiative can succeed without the the resources necessary to support it and give it a chance at that success. Okay. Number four, uh the military uses mismatch as an early warning system, right? So if there are and and business can do the same thing. So if there are big ends, a big goal, right? But there's
36:28 modest means. So you've got a recipe, an early warning sign for overextension, right? you're gonna you're gonna uh um you your resources are going to be too thin across all the various projects and initiatives in to be successful. Right? Again, that's the Crispy Cream example. Okay? If you have strong means, meaning robust resources and vague ends, you're not really sure what it is you want to accomplish. So now you've got wasted
37:05 effort and wasted effort can be just as as uh likely to undermine a business as overextension because with wasted effort comes uh oftentimes a sense on the part of the people who work for the business that they're not accomplishing anything. It demoralizes them and and and when people are demoralized they're even less productive. They're less focused on achieving the ends of whatever project
37:41 it is to which they've been assigned. So strong means are it's terrific to have strong means but one needs to have um ve you know precise well-defined ends otherwise the effort is wasted. And you can have clever ways and unclear ends and now you've got all this activity but there's no impact. So you can have a really clever marketing campaign, but if it's not clear what that campaign is looking to achieve, then you know what
38:16 are you going to do, right? I mean, okay, it's really cool, but nothing in the end no impact is made uh be because the ends were were not uh you you know were not well enough defined, right? So these kinds of mismatches and and how do you identify the mismatches? It's by making sure each of the ends ways and means is examinated closely. You dig below the surface to see what
38:51 assumptions are inherent in each one of them and and and then you you make a very honest assessment as to whether they're aligned. And if you if you get a sense that they're not aligned, that's your early warning system to change what you're doing uh so as to not overextend your business, waste your effort, or create a lot of activity without impact. Okay? So you want to adjust, not double down. Okay? So imbalance is is often defended instead of corrected.
39:29 And that's the wrong strategy. Okay, we want to correct not defend uh an imbalance or a misalignment I think is a better word. Okay, and then finally number five. So make risk explicit and owned. So military doctrine states that risk is unavoidable. Okay, we're not going to avoid risk. We want to be able to manage it effectively. Managing risk is what reduces its
40:06 potential negative impact on a campaign or an operation. Okay? But we're not going to get rid of risk in a military operation. And the same is true in business. There are always risks in business. There are political risks over which rarely does a comp a company have any control. There are market and economic risks again over which a company rarely has any control. right on in March of 2024, uh right before the first wave of
40:43 tariffs were announced, businesses, they had no idea what the uh administration was planning and then it hits and it's like, oh my gosh, there's this new risk uh completely unanticipated, right? And so they had to respond to that. Uh and and you know those kinds of risks are are difficult to impossible um to certainly to avoid um let alone to manage. They come out of left field.
41:18 Right? That's one of the criticisms of uh that was one of the criticisms of of the tariff regime. Right? [snorts] But other risks can be managed. They may not be able to be erased but they can be managed. So we as leaders of businesses we need to look at first of all where where do risks exist? Are there risks in our systems in our technology in the logistics for our operations? Are there risks in our personnel? Do we have certain people who if they leave the
41:56 company or get sick and can't work, they that represent a bottleneck and and the company won't be able to operate or operate nearly as efficiently because they're not there. Okay. So we need to look at the the various risks to our company and then we need to look at why are these risks acceptable and we we may conclude some of them just are not acceptable. So if we have single points of failure because only one person knows
42:31 how to do something well so then that's probably not an an acceptable risk. we need to get some some duplication so that if somebody gets sick or or you know leaves the company the company will continue to uh to operate. So, I know in a in a company I oversee as an asset to an estate, uh, we instituted a a new property management uh, software program and one of the people at the company has has for a long long time handled all of
43:08 the sort of uh, you know, bookkeeping, recordkeeping uh, for the properties. Um, but I made it clear that I wanted at least two people to learn how to use the software because I couldn't have the company in a situation whereas if if this one person, you know, god forbid, got sick or chose to leave the company, all of a sudden we can't manage the properties because no one knows how to use the software. So that's an unex that would be an unacceptable risk to have only one person know how to use a program even in a small company. And this is a small
43:44 company. There's only a handful of people who work there, right? And then so once we've identified the risks, determined which ones are acceptable and which ones are not, and then mitigated the unacceptable risks, that leaves the risks that we've deemed to be acceptable. Who owns those risks? Who in the organization owns them? Does the CEO own all of them? Or are there uh department heads that own some of them? Are there vice presidents or senior vice presidents or
44:21 whatever who owns some of them? Who is responsible for managing that risk? Okay. And and by making it clear who has the responsibility to manage a particular risk, it makes it more likely that if that risk, you know, rears its its ugly head there, you know, someone will be there to respond to it appropriately. Okay. So, business leaders often try to essentially outsource risk to the market or to this
44:56 sort of vague execution. No, that is not the way to handle risk. Yes, there is market risk. Okay. And you know the there there should be someone who is going to be responsible to respond to market risks even though they're essentially in many cases they cannot be anticipated. Okay. But that's probably the job of the CEO or whoever is leading the company. Okay. or or whoever his team is for those kinds of issues. Um market risk is always an acceptable risk
45:33 primarily because it can't be mitigated. It can't be avoided. It's always there. So knowing who is responsible for uh for continually assessing market risk and and responding to it can mean that the organization responds more effectively. Okay. Another in, oh, it was just execution. Well, that's too vague. Who within the team that was executing this project had the responsibility for dealing with that particular type of risk that ended
46:10 up undoing the initiative, right? It needs to get down to that level of granularity. By the way, this is not an an exercise in fingerpointing. That's not the point of it. And you rarely see that within the military itself. You see it outside, but people pointing at this or that within the military structure. Rarely unless unless there's been some kind of extreme dereliction of duty, you don't see that kind of fingerpointing. The idea of knowing who owns a risk is to be
46:49 able to evaluate the person's performance with an eye toward improving it and toward developing lessons learned that can be studied by other people so they can better deal with the particular type of risk and we should implement a similar kind of plan in our businesses as well. Fingerpointing is not the issue. I I emphasize this with all the people with whom I work. The best scenario for me is when somebody makes a mistake and they self-identify
47:24 um and they self-identify quickly. Okay? And and what so one of the reasons I spread the gospel so to speak of I'm not looking to level blame, right? What I'm doing is what I want is to be able to identify problems and as quickly as possible address those problems so we can minimize the negative impact they have on a particular business or a particular uh you know project or strategy within the business. Okay. So if no one owns the risk, the organization absorbs it silently and it
48:01 remains a more potent risk. Okay? Whereas if someone owns the risk, that person is on the lookout for it, can respond to it as quickly as possible and can mitigate its impact and as importantly can provide an what we call in the military an afteraction report so that other people can look at what happened and potentially apply those lessons to the risks for which they're responsible. Okay. So, um, N's ways and means is is a
48:40 framework. It isn't about being, you know, strategically conservative. It's about being honest. It's about identifying the the uh potential pitfalls in a project in an operation so that they can be dealt with before it commences um rather than having to do so on the fly. So disciplined leaders, they don't lower ambition. What they do is they align it with reality so it has the
49:16 best chance for success. Meeting 50% of a goal because it's aligned with reality is far better than trying to go for a goal that's twice as big. And because it's so big and resources are stretched thin, you know, in the end they only make it 25% of the way to the larger goal. Okay? And indeed, making it only 50% of the way to a large goal is not as good as making it 100% of
49:53 the way to a goal that's half that size. Okay? Now, it may be in the end that the goal could have been a little bit larger. Okay? Maybe. And and so then next time maybe push a little bit more. You only reach 90%. Okay? But you got farther than you would have if you'd set a less ambitious goal. Okay? Those are all judgment calls. They're all part of how one executes using the ends, ways, and means strategy, but it should be looked at as a process of aligning to reality. Okay.
50:33 So, I I thank you very much for joining me today. Uh hope you found this uh first uh episode uh first of 24h episode um uh en enlightening and and enjoyable. If you have questions, comments, criticisms, uh links to uh social media will be in the show notes. Always happy to read those. Um, if you like the show, um, if you're watching this on, uh, Spotify or Apple Podcast or or for that matter YouTube, um, please uh, drop a
51:09 comment um, what you like about the show. I would really appreciate that. It will help me attract new viewers and listeners, which is really the point of the show is to help out more people. And finally, if you're not on my uh subscription list on YouTube, please do consider subscribing to my YouTube channel and that way you'll always know uh when a new show is going live. So, thanks again very much for joining me today. Wishing you a wonderful rest of the day and signing off as I always do. Marie darling, you are my bell.